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Networks Using Fuzzy Systems 
Amin Einipour 
Abstract - The Internet and computer networks are exposed to 
an increasing number of security threats. With new types of 
attacks appearing continually, developing flexible and adaptive 
security oriented approaches is a severe challenge. Intrusion 
detection is a significant focus of research in the security of 
computer systems and networks. The security of computer 
networks plays a strategic role in modern computer systems. 
In order to enforce high protection levels against threats, a 
number of software tools are currently developed.  
In this paper, we have focused on intrusion detection 
in computer networks by combination of fuzzy systems and 
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm. Fuzzy rules are 
desirable because of their interpretability by human experts. 
PSO algorithm is employed as meta-heuristic algorithm to 
optimize the obtained set of fuzzy rules. Results on intrusion 
detection dataset from KDD-Cup99 show that the proposed 
approach would be capable of classifying instances with high 
accuracy rate in addition to adequate interpretability of 
extracted rules.  
Keywords : Intrusion Detection, Fuzzy rule extraction, 
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm.  
I. Introduction 
ata mining usually means the methodologies and 
tools for the efficient new knowledge discovery 
from databases. It is also a form of knowledge 
discovery essential for solving problems in a specific 
domain.  
An intrusion is defined as any set of actions that 
attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of a resource [1]. An Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) monitors and restricts user access to the 
computer system by applying certain rules. These rules 
are based on expert knowledge extracted from skilled 
administrators, who construct attack scenarios and 
apply them to find system exploits. The system identifies 
all intrusions by users and takes or recommends 
necessary action to stop an attack on the database.  
Two approaches to intrusion detection are 
currently used. The first one, called misuse detection, is 
based on attack signatures, i.e., on a detailed 
description of the sequence of actions performed by the 
attacker. This approach allows the detection of 
intrusions matching perfectly the signatures, so that new 
attacks performed by slight modification of known 
attacks cannot be detected. The second approach is 
based on statistical knowledge about the normal activity  
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of the computer system, i.e., a statistical profile of what 
constitutes the legitimate traffic in the network. In this 
case, intrusions correspond to anomalous network 
activity, i.e. to traffic whose statistical profile deviates 
significantly from the normal one [2, 3].  
Earlier studies, the statistical related techniques 
were most commonly used data mining approaches to 
construct classification models. However, as the 
intrusion detection classification problem is highly 
nonlinear in nature, it is hard to develop a 
comprehensive model taking into account all the 
independent variables using conventional statistical 
modeling techniques. Furthermore, traditional ad hoc 
mixtures of statistical techniques and data management 
tools are no longer adequate for analyzing the vast 
collection of data. For the needs of improving the 
prediction accuracy in intrusion detection, more and 
more researchers have tried to apply artificial 
intelligence related approaches for intrusion detection in 
computer networks [4, 5].  
A good computerized detection tool should 
possess two characteristics. First, the tool must attain 
the highest possible performance. Moreover, it would be 
highly desirable to be in possession of a so-called 
degree of confidence: the system not only provides a 
crisp detection, but also outputs a numeric value that 
represents the degree to which the system is confident 
about its response. Second, it would be highly beneficial 
for such a detection system to be human-friendly, 
exhibiting so-called interpretability. This means that the 
experts in computer networks is not faced with a black 
box that simply spouts answers (albeit correct) with no 
explanation; rather, we would like for the system to 
provide some insight as to how it derives its outputs.  
Some experimental studies reported that 
success of artificial neural networks in intrusion 
detection [6-8], but there is a major drawback in 
building and using a model in which the user cannot 
readily comprehend the final rules that neural networks 
models acquire. In other words, the results of training a 
neural network are internal weights distributed 
throughout the network. These weights provide no more 
insight into why the solution is valid than asking many 
human experts why a particular decision is the right 
decision. For example, the weights are not readily 
understandable although, increasingly, sophisticated 
techniques for probing into neural networks help provide 
some explanation. It is also some recently studies used 
D 
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meta-heuristic and K-NN approaches to intrusion 
detection which interpretability of these approaches 
higher than of neural networks [9-12, 21].  
In this paper we combine two methodologies—
fuzzy systems and meta-heuristic algorithm—so as to 
automatically produce systems for intrusion detection in 
computer networks. The major advantage of fuzzy 
systems is that they favor interpretability; however, 
finding good fuzzy systems can be quite an arduous 
task. This is where PSO algorithm step in, enabling the 
automatic production of fuzzy systems, based on a 
database of training cases. Our fuzzy-PSO approach 
produces systems exhibiting two prime characteristics: 
first, they attain high classification performance, with the 
possibility of attributing a confidence measure to the 
output detection; second, the resulting systems involve 
a few simple rules, and are therefore (human-) 
interpretable.  
We believe the development of PSO algorithm 
for data mining is a promising research area, due to the 
following rationale.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we describe the Intrusion detection problem and KDD99 
dataset, which is the focus of our interest in this paper. 
The third section describes the fuzzy systems based 
classification. Section 4 describes our particular PSO-
Fuzzy approach to the intrusion detection problem. The 
fifth section reports on computational results evaluating 
the performance of the proposed system. Finally, the 
sixth section concludes the paper.  
II. The intrusion detection problem 
and kdd cup 99 dataset 
The first major work in the area of intrusion 
detection was discussed by J.P Anderson in [13]. 
Anderson introduced the concept that certain types of 
threats to the security of computer systems could be 
identified through a review of information contained in 
the system‘s audit trail. Many types of operating 
systems, particularly the various ―flavors‖ of UNIX, 
automatically create a report which details the activity 
occurring on the system. Anderson identified three 
threats which could be identified from a concentrated 
review of the audit data:  
1. External Penetrations - Unauthorized users of the 
system.  
2. Internal Penetrations - Authorized system users who 
utilize the system in an unauthorized manner.  
3. Misfeasors - Authorized user who mislead their 
access privileges.  
Anderson indicated that a particular class of 
external attackers, known as clandestine users, were 
particularly dangerous to the system resources. 
Clandestine users are those who evade both system 
access controls and auditing mechanisms through the 
manipulation of system privileges or by operating at a 
level that is lower than what is regularly monitored by the 
audit trail. Anderson suggested that clandestine users 
could be detected by lowering the level which is 
monitored by the audit trail, monitoring the functions that 
turn off the audit systems, or through a comparison of 
defined ―normal‖ usage patterns of system resource 
usage with those levels which are currently observed.  
While the concept of manually reviewing 
operating system audit records for indications of 
intrusions was recognized as an extremely inefficient 
method of securing a computer system, Anderson‘s 
article served to initiate research into the area of 
intrusion detection. Subsequent research involved the 
development of automated techniques for the review of 
audit record data. Until recently, most intrusion detection 
mechanisms were based on an automated approach to 
Anderson's concepts. However, the recent development 
of new intrusion detection approaches and, more 
significantly, the necessary application of intrusion 
detection technologies to networked environments, is 
changing the focus of intrusion detection research.  
Dr. Dorothy Denning proposed an intrusion 
detection model in 1987 which became a landmark in 
the research in this area [14]. The model which she 
proposed forms the fundamental core of most intrusion 
detection methodologies in use today. Because of the 
applicability of these concepts to most accepted 
intrusion detection systems, an overview of the primary 
concepts of the model are presented here to provide a 
basis of understanding the core technology.  
Any statistical intrusion detection methodology 
requires the use of a set of definable metrics. These 
indices are the elements upon which all of the tool's 
statistical analysis is based. These metrics characterize 
the utilization of a variety of system resources. The 
resources which would be used in the definition of the 
metrics are required to be system characteristics which 
can be statistically based, (i.e., CPU usage, number of 
files accessed, number of login attempts).  
These metrics are usually one of three different 
types. Event counters identify the occurrences of a 
specific action over a period of time. These metrics may 
include the number of login attempts, the number of 
times that a file has been accessed, or a measure of the 
number of incorrect passwords that are entered.  
The second metric, time intervals, identify the 
time interval between two related events. Each time 
interval compares the delay in occurrence of
 
the same 
or similar event An example of a time interval metric is 
the periods of time between a user‘s logins. 
 
Finally, resource measurement is the concept of 
quantifying the amount of resources used by the system 
over a given period of time. Resource measurement 
incorporates individual event counters and time interval 
metrics to quantify the system. Examples of resource 
measurements include the expenditure of CPU time, 
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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number of records written to a database, or the number 
of files transmitted over the network.  
While not normally considered with the 
"traditional" intrusion detection metrics, keystroke 
dynamics is another method of quantifying a user's 
activities which offers an effective measure of user 
identification. The concept involves the development of 
an electronic signature of a user based on their 
individual typing characteristics. These characteristics 
usually include typing speed, intervals in typing, number 
of errors, and the user's typing rhythm. These 
characteristics may be verified on login and/or 
monitored throughout a session. Complete intrusion 
detection mechanisms have been developed exclusively 
around the use of keystroke dynamics techniques. [15]  
In 1998, DARPA in concert with Lincoln 
Laboratory at MIT launched the DARPA 1998 dataset for 
evaluating IDS [16]. The DARPA 1998 dataset contains 
seven weeks of training and also two weeks of testing 
data. In total, there are 38 attacks in training data as well 
as in testing data. The refined version of DARPA dataset 
which contains only network data (i.e. Tcpdump data) is 
termed as KDD dataset [17]. The Third International 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools 
Competition were held in colligation with KDD-99, the 
Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery 
and Data Mining. KDD dataset is a dataset employed for 
this Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining Tools Competition. KDD training dataset consists 
of relatively 4,900,000 single connection vectors where 
each single connection vectors consists of 41 features 
and is marked as either normal or an attack, with exactly 
one particular attack type [18]. These features had all 
forms of continuous and symbolic with extensively 
varying ranges falling in four categories:  
• In a connection, the first category consists of the 
intrinsic features which comprises of the 
fundamental features of each individual TCP 
connections. Some of the features for each 
individual TCP connections are duration of the 
connection, the type of the protocol (TCP, UDP, 
etc.) and network service (http, telnet, etc.).  
• The content features suggested by domain 
knowledge are used to assess the payload of the 
original TCP packets, such as the number of failed 
login attempts.  
• Within a connection, the same host features 
observe the recognized connections that have the 
same destination host as present connection in past 
two seconds and the statistics related to the 
protocol behavior, service, etc are estimated.  
• The similar same service features scrutinize the 
connections that have the same service as the 
current connection in past two seconds.  
A variety of attacks incorporated in the dataset 
fall into following four major categories:  
Denial of Service Attacks (DOS): A denial of 
service attack is an attack where the attacker constructs 
some computing or memory resource fully occupied or 
unavailable to manage legitimate requirements, or reject 
legitimate users right to use a machine.  
User to Root Attacks(U2R): User to Root 
exploits are a category of exploits where the attacker 
initiate by accessing a normal user account on the 
system (possibly achieved by tracking down the 
passwords, a dictionary attack, or social engineering) 
and take advantage of some susceptibility to achieve 
root access to the system.  
Remote to User Attacks (R2L): A Remote to 
User attack takes place when an attacker who has the 
capability to send packets to a machine over a network 
but does not have an account on that machine, makes 
use of some vulnerability to achieve local access as a 
user of that machine.  
Probes (PRB): Probing is a category of attacks 
where an attacker examines a network to collect 
information or discover well-known vulnerabilities. These 
network investigations are reasonably valuable for an 
attacker who is staging an attack in future. An attacker 
who has a record, of which machines and services are 
accessible on a given network, can make use of this 
information to look for fragile points.  
Table1 illustrates a number of attacks falling into 
four major categories and table 2 presents a complete 
listing of a set of features characterized for the 
connection records.  
Table 1 :
 
Various types of attacks described in four major categories
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial of Service Attacks(DOS) Back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop
User to Root Attacks(U2R) Buffer _overflow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit,
Remote to Local Attacks(R2L) Ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, warezmaster
Probes(PRB) Satan, ipsweep, nmap, portsweep
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Table 2 : A complete list of features given in KDD cup 99 dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.
 
Fuzzy system based classification
 
Let us assume that our pattern classification
 
problem is a c -class problem in the n – dimensional
 
pattern space with continuous attributes. We also
 
assume              that m real                     vectors
 
                                                                     ,       are      given     as
 
training patterns from the c classes            .
 
Because the pattern space is [0,1]n
 
, attribute
values
 
of each pattern are                                         
 
and
 
. In computer simulations of this paper,
 
we
normalize all attribute values of each data set into
 
the 
unit interval [0,
 
1].
 
In the pr
 
esented fuzzy classifier system, we use
 
fuzzy if-then rules of the following form:
 
Rule  : If  is and … and is , 
then
 
Class with .
 
where is the label of the jth fuzzy if–then rule,
 
are   antecedent  fuzzy sets on the unit
 
interval [0,1] , is the consequent class (i.e., one of
 
the given c classes), and is the grade of
 
certainty of 
the fuzzy if–then rule . In computer
 
simulations, we 
Feature
index
feature name description Type
1 duration length (number of seconds) of the connection Continuous
2 Protocol_type type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc. Symbolic
3 service network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet,etc. Symbolic
4 flag normal or error status of the connection Symbolic
5 Src_Bytes number of data bytes from destination to source Continuous
6 Dst_Bytes number of data bytes from destination to source Continuous
7 Land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise Symbolic
8 wrong_fragment number of ``wrong'' fragments Continuous
9 Urgent number of urgent packets Continuous
10 hot number of ``hot'' indicators Continuous
11 num_failed_logins number of failed login attempts Continuous
12 logged_in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Symbolic
13 num_compromised number of ``compromised'' conditions Continuous
14 root_shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise Continuous
15 su_attempted 1 if ``su root'' command attempted; 0 otherwise Continuous
16 num_root number of ``root'' accesses Continuous
17 num_file_creations number of file creation operations Continuous
18 num_shells number of shell prompts Continuous
19 num_access_files number of operations on access control files Continuous
20 num_outbound_cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp session Continuous
21 is_hot_login 1 if the login belongs to the ``hot'' list; 0 otherwise Symbolic
22 is_guest_login 1 if the login is a ``guest'' login; 0 otherwise Symbolic
23 Count number of connections to the same host as the current 
connection in the past two seconds
Continuous
24 Srv_count number of connections to the same service as the current 
connection in the past two seconds
Continuous
25 serror_rate % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors Continuous
26 srv_serror_rate % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors Continuous
27 rerror_rate % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors Continuous
28 srv_rerror_rate % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors Continuous
29 same_srv_rate % of connections to the same service Continuous
30 diff_srv_rate % of connections to different services Continuous
31 srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to different hosts Continuous
32 dst_host_count count for destination host Continuous 
33 dst_host_srv_count srv_count for destination host Continuous
34 dst_host_same_srv_rate same_srv_rate for destination host Continuous
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate diff_srv_rate for destination host Continuous
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate same_src_port_rate for destination host Continuous
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate diff_host_rate for destination host Continuous
38 dst_host_serror_rate serror_rate for destination host Continuous
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate srv_serror_rate for destination host Continuous
40 dst_host_rerror_rate rerror_rate for destination host Continuous
41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate srv_serror_rate for destination host Continuous
1 2( , ,..., ), 1,2,...,p p p pnx x x x p m 
( mc  )
[0,1]pix  for 1,2,...,p m
1,2,...,i n
jR
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
1x 1jA nx jnA
jC jCF CF
jR
1,...,j jnA A
jC
jCF
jR
use a typical set of linguistic values in Fig. 1 as 
antecedent fuzzy sets. The membership function of 
each linguistic value in Fig. 1 is specified by 
homogeneously partitioning the domain of each
attribute into symmetric triangular fuzzy sets. We use
such a simple specification in computer simulations to
show the high performance of our fuzzy classifier
system, even if the membership function of each
antecedent fuzzy set is not tailored. However, we can
use any tailored membership functions in our fuzzy
classifier system for a particular pattern classification
problem.
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Fig. 1 : The used antecedent fuzzy sets in this paper. 1: 
Small, 2: medium small, 3: medium, 4: medium large, 5: 
large, and 6: don’t care 
The total number of fuzzy if–then rules is in the 
case of the -dimensional pattern classification problem. 
It is impossible to use all the fuzzy if– then rules in a 
single fuzzy rule base when the number of attributes  
(i.e. ) is large (e.g., intrusion detection problem which n 
= 41). 6n n 6n n  
Our fuzzy classifier system searches for a 
relatively small number of fuzzy if–then rules with high 
classification ability. Since the consequent class and the 
certainty grade of each fuzzy if–then rule can be 
determined from training patterns by a simple heuristic 
procedure [19], the task of our fuzzy classifier system is 
to generate combinations of antecedent fuzzy sets for a 
set of fuzzy if–then rules. While this task seems to be 
simple at first glance, in fact it is very difficult for high-
dimensional pattern classification problems, since the 
search space involves combinations. 6n  
In our fuzzy classifier system, the consequent 
Class and the grade of certainty of each fuzzy if– then 
rule are determined by a modified version of the 
heuristic procedure which is discussed in [18][19]. j C j 
CF  
 
Swarm intelligence describes the collective 
behavior of decentralized, self organized natural or 
artificial systems. Swam intelligence model were 
employed in artificial intelligence. The expression was 
introduced in the year 1989 by Jing wang and Gerardo 
Beni in cellular robotic systems. Swarm Intelligence (SI) 
was a innovative pattern for solving optimizing 
problems. SI systems are typically made up of 
populations of simple agents interacting locally with one 
another and with their environment. The agent follows 
simple rules and the interactions between agents lead to 
the emergence of “intelligent” global behavior, unknown 
to the individual agents. Examples of SI include ant 
colonies, bird flocking, animal herding, bacterial growth 
and fish schooling.  
The example algorithms of Swarm Intelligence 
are i) Ant Colony Optimization ii) Particle Swarm 
Optimization iii) Gravitational Search Algorithm             
iv) Stochastic diffusion search. Particle Swarm
Optimization belongs to the class of swarm intelligence 
techniques that are used to resolve the optimization 
problems.  
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) works with a 
population-based heuristic inspired by the social 
behavior of bird flocking aiming to find food [20]. In 
Particle Swarm Optimization the system initializes with a 
set of solutions and searches for optima by updating 
generations. The set of possible solutions is a set of 
particles, called swarm, which moves in the search 
space, in a cooperative search procedure. These moves 
are performed by an operator called velocity of a particle 
and moves it through an n-dimensional space based on 
the best positions of their leader (social component) and 
on their own best position (local component).  
The main strength of PSO is its fast 
convergence, which compares with many global 
optimization algorithms like Genetic algorithms, 
Simulated Annealing and other global optimization 
algorithms. Particle Swarm Optimization shares many 
similarities with evolutionary computation techniques 
such as Genetic Algorithms. The system is initialized 
with a population of random solutions and searches for 
optima by updating generations. PSO has no evolution 
operators such as cross over and mutation. In PSO, the 
potential solutions called particles fly through the 
problem space by following the current optimum 
particles. PSO is a global optimization algorithm for 
dealing with problems in which a best solution can be 
represented as a point or surface search in n-
dimensional space.  
Hypotheses are plotted in this space and 
seeded with an initial velocity as well as a 
communication channel between the particles. Particles 
then move through the solution space and are evaluated 
according to some fitness criterion following each
 
time 
step. The particles were accelerated in the direction of 
communication grouping which have better fitness 
values. The main advantage of such approach great 
global minimization strategies such as simulated 
annealing is that the large number of members
 
that 
make up the particle swarm formulate the technique 
impressively flexible to the problem of local minima. 
 
Each particle keeps track of its coordinates in 
the problem space which are associated with the best 
solution it has achieved so far. This value
 
is called 
pbest. Another best value that is tracked by the particle 
swarm optimizer is the best value, obtained so far by 
any particle in the neighbors of the particle. This location 
is called lbest. When a particle takes all the population 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II 
 I
ss
ue
 X
I 
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
23
  
 
(
DDDD
)
D
  
20
12
Y
e
a
r
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 :
 
Basic structure of a fuzzy inference system for intrusion detection
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as its topological neighbors, the best value is a global 
best and is called gbest. 
The basic idea of combining PSO with data 
mining is simple. To extract this knowledge, a database 
may be considered as a large search space and a 
mining algorithm as a search strategy. PSO makes use 
of particles moving in an n-dimensional space to search 
for solutions for an n-variable function optimization 
problem. The datasets are the sample space to search 
and each attribute is a dimension for the PSO-miner. 
The pseudo-code of the PSO-Based Search 
algorithm is presented in figure 2. Note that the input of 
this algorithm is a fuzzy rule and the output is an 
improved version of that fuzzy rule.
Fig. 2 : Pseudo-code for the PSO-Based Search 
algorithm
a) Proposed Fuzzy-PSO Approach for Intrusion 
Detection in Computer Networks 
Outline of the proposed approach for intrusion 
detection follows in figure 3. 
A fuzzy inference system is a rule-based system 
that uses fuzzy logic, rather than Boolean logic, to 
reason about data [23]. Its basic structure includes four 
main components, as depicted in Fig. 3: (1) a fuzzifier, 
which translates crisp (real-valued) inputs into fuzzy 
values; (2) an inference engine that applies a fuzzy 
reasoning mechanism to obtain a fuzzy output; (3) a 
defuzzifier, which translates this latter output into a crisp 
value; and (4) a knowledge base, which contains both 
an ensemble of fuzzy rules, known as the rule base, and 
an ensemble of membership functions, known as the 
database.
For each particle
Initialize particle
End For
Do
For each particle
Calculate fitness value of the particle fp
/*updating particle‘s best fitness value so far)*/
If fp is better than pBest
set current value as the new pBest
End For
/*updating population‘s best fitness value so far)*/
Set gBest to the best fitness value of all particles
For each particle
Calculate particle velocity according equation (1)
Update particle position according equation (2)
End For
While maximum iterations OR minimum error criteria 
is not attained
Target
Data set
DatabaseCrisp
Input
Normalization
Fuzzification
Inference Engine
Crisp
Output
Best Rule base
Rule base
Defuzzifier
Knowledge base
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KDD99 dataset
Preprocessing Target dataset
Generate an initial set of 
fuzzy if–then rules
Normalization
Fuzzification 
Evaluate cost of current 
rule-base using evaluation 
function
Modify current rule-base 
using PSO Algorithm
Generate an new set of 
fuzzy if–then rules
Evaluate cost of new rule-
base using evaluation 
function
Best Rule base
Fig. 4 : Generate Best Knowledge base Using PSO
The decision-making process is performed by 
the inference engine using the rules contained in the rule 
base. These fuzzy rules define the connection between
input and output fuzzy variables. 
Fuzzy modeling is the task of identifying the 
parameters of a fuzzy inference system so that a desired 
behavior is attained [24]. With the direct approach a 
fuzzy model is constructed using knowledge from a 
human expert. This task becomes difficult when the 
available knowledge is incompleteor when the problem 
space is very large, thus motivating the use of automatic 
approaches to fuzzy modeling. 
There are several approaches to fuzzy 
modeling, based on neural networks [25, 26, 27], 
genetic algorithms [28, 29], and hybrid methods [9]. 
In this paper we use Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) as automatic approach to produce 
knowledge base which indicated in figure 4. 
In the next subsection we describe some steps 
of the proposed approach which presented in figure       
3, 4. 
i. Generate initial rule-base 
There are different method for generate initial 
rule-base. One of the methods is that we assigned one 
of the symbols in figure 1 randomly. One method is that 
we increase probability of don‗t care fuzzy term. One 
innovative method is that we generate fuzzy if-then rules 
directly using training set. First, compatible fuzzy if-then 
rule is created; then antecedent part of some rules is 
replaced with don‗t care term. 
The proposed evolutionary fuzzy system (EFS) 
is considered for each of the classes of the classification 
problem separately. One of the important benefits of this 
separation is that the learning system can focus on each 
of the classes of the classification problem. According 
to this fact, the mentioned random pattern is extracted 
according to the patterns of the training dataset, which 
their consequent class is the same as the class that the 
algorithm works on. Next, for this random pattern, we 
determine the most compatible combination of 
antecedent fuzzy sets using only the five linguistic 
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values (Figure. 1). The compatibility of antecedent fuzzy
rules with the random pattern is calculated by equation 
(1). 
  
(1)
Where         (.)    is the membership function of Aji. 
After generating each fuzzy if-then rule, the
consequent class of this rule is determined according to
(2). 
 
 (2)
Where, 
 
 (3)
Where  Class h (R j ) is the sum of the
compatibility grades of the training patterns in Class h
with the fuzzy if–then rule Rj and N Class h is the
number of training patterns which their corresponding
class is Class h . Each of the fuzzy rules in the final
classification has a certainty grade, which denotes the
strength of that fuzzy rule. This number is calculated
according to (4). 
 
(4)
Where, 
 
(5) 
 
 
ii. Evaluate rule-base 
The generation of each fuzzy rule is accepted 
only if its consequent class is the same as its 
corresponding random pattern class. Otherwise, the 
generated fuzzy rule is rejected and the rule generation 
process is repeated. After generation of N pop fuzzy if-
then rules, the fitness value of each rule is evaluated by 
classifying all the given training patterns using the set of 
fuzzy if–then rules in the current population. The fitness 
value of the fuzzy if–then rule is evaluated by the 
following fitness function: 
 
  (6) 
 
Where denotes the number of 
correctly classified training patterns by rule     . 
iii. PSO-based rule set update and optimization 
As we have mentioned in the previous 
subsections, initial rule-base is generated randomly, so 
that accuracy of the initial rule-base is low. For optimize 
initial rule-base, we use an PSO algorithm. 
Input of this algorithm is a fuzzy rule and the 
output is an improved version of that fuzzy rule. The 
improvement is accomplished by some modifications 
(local search) to the current (input) fuzzy rule. The 
algorithm is capable of searching for the best 
modification according to the lifetime of the current fuzzy 
rule. in each step the algorithm performs one changes 
to the current (input) fuzzy rule. For each one value, a 
complete PSO process is done. 
In PSO there are many fitness functions. By
exploring Pareto dominance concepts, it is possible to
obtain results with specific properties. Based on this 
concept each particle of the swarm could have different 
leaders, but only one may be selected to update the 
velocity. This set of leaders is stored in a repository, 
which contains the best non-dominated solutions found. 
The PSO components are defined as follows [22]. 
Each particle pi, at a time step t, has a position
x (t) ϵ Rn, that represents a possible solution. The
position of the particle, at time t +1, is obtained by
adding its velocity, v (t) ϵ Rn, to x (t): 
 
  (9) 
 
The velocity of a particle pi is based on the best 
position already fetched by the particle, pbest(t), and the
best position already fetched by the set of neighbors of
pi, Rh(t), that is a leader from the repository. The velocity 
update function, in time step t +1 is defined as follows: 
 
 
 (10) 
  
The variables ϕ1and ϕ2, in Equation 10, are 
coefficients that determine the influence of the particle‗s 
positions. The constants c1 and c2 indicates how much 
each component influences on the velocity. The 
coefficient ϖ is the particle inertia and controls how 
much the previous velocity affects the current one Rh is 
a particle from the repository, chosen as a guide of pi. 
There are many ways to make this choice. At the end of 
the algorithm, the solutions in the repository are the final 
output.  
 
Experiments were carried out on a subset of the 
database created by DARPA in the framework of the 
1998 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program [16]. We 
used the subset that was pre-processed by the 
Columbia University and distributed as part of the UCI 
KDD Archive [17]Error! Reference source not found. The
available database is made up of a large number of 
network connections related to normal and malicious 
traffic. Each connection is represented with a 41-
dimensional feature vector which presented in table 2. 
Connections are also labeled as belonging to one out of 
1 1( ) ( ) . . . ( ),j p j p jn pnx x x     1,2,. . ., ,p m
( ) ( )     , 1, 2,...,
j
p
Class h j R p
x Class h
R x h c 

 
  1  ( ) max{ ( ),..., ( )}.jClass C j Class j Class c jR R R  
 
jiA

β
1
( )
( )
jClass C j
j c
Class h j
h
R
CF
R
 





( )
1
j
Class h j
h C
R
c






( ) ( )j jfitness R NCP R
NCP(R j ) 
Rj 
x (t +1) = x (t)+v (t +1
v(t+1)= ϖ * v(t) + (c1 * ϕ1) * (pbest(t) - x(t)) + (c2 * 
ϕ2) * (Rh(t) - x(t)) 
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five classes. One of these classes is the normal class 
and the rest indicates four different intrusion classes: 
PRB, DOS, U2R, and R2L which presented in table 1. 
These intrusion classes are a classification of 22 
different types of attacks in a computer network.  
This approach is implemented by using C++ 
programming language. We use 10-CV technique for 
evaluate proposed approach. In this technique, KDD99 
dataset divided to 10 parties, nine parties for train set 
and one party for test set.  
Table 3 is the confusion matrix of Proposed 
approach. The top-left entry of Table 3 shows that 3194 
instances of the actual PRB test set were detected to be 
PRB; the last column indicates that 76.66% of the actual 
PRB samples were detected correctly. In the same way, 
for R2L, 1971 instances of the actual ‗attack‗ test set 
were correctly detected. The last column indicates that 
12.17% of the actual R2L samples were detected 
correctly. The bottom row shows that 83.48% of the test 
set classified, as R2L indeed belongs to R2L. The 
bottom-right entry of the table 3 shows that 93.70% of all 
patterns in the test set are correctly classified.  
Table 4 represents the cost matrix that defines 
the cost for each type of misclassification.  
We aim at minimizing that cost function. Given 
the confusion and cost matrixes, we calculated the cost 
of our simulated annealing based fuzzy intrusion 
detection system as shown in table 5. The bottom-right 
entry of the table 5 shows that the classification cost of 
our algorithm is 0.1872.  
Proposed approach is compared with some 
algorithms, such as C4.5, k-NN, Naïve Bayes, SVM, 
MLP. Result of comparison is indexed in table 6.  
Table 3 : Confusion Matrix for the Proposed Approach 
 
 
 Table 4 :
 
Cost Matrix Used To Evaluate the
 
Confusion of 
Proposed Approach
 
 
Table 5 :  Cost-Based Scoring of the Proposed Approach 
 
  
  
Detected Class
Real 
Class
PRB DOS U2R R2L
PRB 0 612 0 0
DOS 576 0 20 0
U2R 232 0 0 22
R2L 154 6894 16 0
0.1872
Detected Class
Real Class
PR
B
DOS U2R R2L
PRB 0 2 2 2
DOS 1 0 2 2
U2R 2 2 0 2
R2L 2 2 2 0
   Detected Class
Real 
Class
PRB DOS U2R R2L %
PRB 3194 306 0 0 76.66
DOS 576 226388 10 0 98.49
U2R 116 0 37 11 16.22
R2L 77 3447 8 1971 12.17
% 76.66 98.33 46.83 83.48 93.70
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Table 6 : Recall, Precision, and F-measure For Different Classifier. The Best Values are Bold
In this paper, we focused on intrusion detection 
in computer networks by combination of fuzzy systems 
and PSO algorithm. The proposed method performs the 
classification task and extracts required knowledge 
using fuzzy rule based systems which consists of fuzzy 
if-then rules. Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm is 
employed to optimize the obtained set of fuzzy rules. 
The proposed system has two main features of data 
mining techniques which are high reliability and 
adequate interpretability, and is comparable with several 
well-known algorithms. Results on intrusion detection 
data set from KDD cup-99 repository show that the 
proposed approach would be capable of classifying 
intrusion instances with high accuracy rate in addition to 
adequate interpretability of extracted rules. 
1. Heady, G. Luger, A. Maccabe, and M. Servilla, -The 
architecture of network level intrusion detection 
system‖, echnical Report, Department of Computer 
Science, University of New Mexico, 1990. 
2. J. McHugh, A. Christie, and J. Allen, ―Defending 
Yourself: The Role of Intrusion Detection Systems‖, 
IEEE Software, Sept./Oct. 2000, pp. 42-51 
3. P.E. Proctor, The Practical Intrusion Detection 
Handbook, Prentice Hall, 2001 
4. Xu L., A. Krzyzak and C.Y. Suen, "Methods for 
combining multiple classifiers and their applications 
to handwriting recognition", IEEE Trans. Systems, 
Man and Cybernetics 22, 1992, pp. 418-435. 
5. Anderson D, Lunt TF, Javitz H, Tamaru A, Valdes A. 
"Detecting unusual program behavior using the 
statistical component of the next-generation 
intrusion detection expert system (NIDES)", Menlo 
Park, CA, USA: Computer Science Laboratory, SRI 
International; 1995. SRIO-CSL-95-06. 
6. A.K. Ghosh and A. Schwartzbard, ―A Study in 
Using Neural Networks for Anomaly and Misuse 
Detection", Proc. of the USENIX Security 
Symposium, August 23-26, 1999, Washington, USA. 
7. J. Cannady, ―An adaptive neural network approach 
to intrusion detection and response‖, PhD Thesis, 
School of Comp. and Inf. Sci., Nova Southeastern 
University, 2000. 
8. J.M. Bonifacio et al. ―Neural Networks applied in 
intrusion detection systems‖, Proc. of the IEEE 
World congress on Comp. Intell. (WCCI ‗98), 1998. 
9. Mohammad saniee abadeh, Jafar Habibi, " A 
Hybridization of Evolutionary Fuzzy Systems and 
Ant Colony Optimization for Intrusion Detection ", 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY, (2010), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 33-45. 
10. Mohammad saniee abadeh, hamid mohammadi, 
Jafar Habibi, "Design and analysis of genetic fuzzy 
systems for intrusion detection in computer 
networks ", EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH 
APPLICATIONS, (2011), Vol. 38, No. 6, pp. 7067-
7075. 
11. M Saniee, Jafar Habibi, C Lucas, "Intrusion 
Detection Using a Fuzzy Genetics-Based learning 
algorithm", JOURNAL OF NETWORK AND 
COMPUTER APPLICATIONS, (2007), No. 0, pp. 
414-428. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm
C4.5
5-NN
Error! 
Reference 
source not 
found.
SVM
Error! 
Referen
ce 
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not 
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Winner 
Entry
Proposed Approach
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PRB
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